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Abstract
We study the strategic advantages of following rules of thumb that bundle different games together
(called rule rationality) when this may be observed by one’s opponent. We present a model in which
the strategic environment determines which kind of rule rationality is adopted by the players. We
apply the model to characterize the induced rules and outcomes in various interesting environments.
Finally, we show the close relations between act rationality and “Stackelberg stability” (no player
can earn from playing first). JEL classification: C72, D82.
1 Introduction
Act rationality is the notion that perfectly rational agents choose actions that maximize their utility
in every specific situation. However, both introspection and experimental evidence suggest that people
behave differently and follow “rule rationality”: they adopt rules of thumb, or modes of behavior, that
maximize some measure of average utility taken over the set of decision situations to which that rule
applies; then, when making a decision, they choose an action that accords with the rule they have
adopted. As a result of bundling together many decision situations, this rule of thumb induces smaller
cognitive costs and fewer informational requirements (see Baumol & Quandt, 1964; Harsanyi, 1977;
Ellison & Fudenberg, 1993; Aumann, 2008, and the references there).
Reducing the cognitive costs is arguably the main advantage of such rules of thumb, but it is not the
only advantage. In this paper we focus on an aspect of rule rationality that has not been studied in the
literature. If players tend to bundle games together while interacting with others who gradually learn
the structure of bundling, then bundling can serve as a commitment device.1The contribution of this
paper is threefold: (1) We present a tractable model in which the properties of the strategic environment
determine which kind of rule rationality is adopted by the players; (2) we characterize the induced rules
and outcomes in various interesting environments; and (3) we show the close relations between act
rationality and “Stackelberg stability” (no player can earn from playing before his opponent).
A common manifestation of bundling as a commitment device is the tendency to stress moral or
ideological principles for strategic reasons. When the US declares that it will never abandon its allies, or
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when a businessman claims that he has never reneged on his promises on moral grounds, they are doing
precisely this. Since these commitments refer not to a single game but to a class of games, they are
distinguishable from those often discussed in the economics or the political science literature (see, e.g.,
the seminal work of Schelling, 1960, and the recent papers of Bade et al., 2009; Renou, 2009). Moral
principles by their nature bundle multiple situations by means of the action that the principle dictates.
Indeed, the extent to which the commitment to act according to a moral or ideological principle is
credible depends on comparing the cost of adhering to the principle relative to the cost of losing the
commitment benefits in the future. These are the kind of considerations we employ in our model to
define rule rationality. The declaration of such principles can be viewed as a signal that facilitates the
gradual learning about one’s bundling strategy by others. To be sure, these signals are not fully revealing
but the fact that these declarations are very often made and often taken seriously suggests that stressing
ideological or moral principles is not merely cheap talk either.
Another form of rule rationality relevant to our context includes firms or organizations that adopt
rigid policies applying to a broad class of circumstances without elaborating the rationale of each policy.
If a craftsman rejects an offer to accept 50% of his proposed price for doing 50% of the job on the basis
the it is "unprofessional" or when a chain store rejects a returned item after the refund deadline even
under exceptional circumstances by simply arguing that “it is against our policy”, they act within this
form of rule rationality.
We now briefly present our model. An environment is a finite set of two-player normal-form games
that share the same set of feasible actions.2 The environment is endowed with a function that determines
the probability of each game being played. Each environment induces the following two-stage meta-game:
at stage 1, each player chooses a partition over the set of games; at stage 2, each player chooses an action
after observing the element of his partition that includes the realized game and his opponent’s partition.3
A rule-rational equilibrium of the environment is defined as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the meta-
game. We interpret such an equilibrium as a stable outcome of a dynamic process of social learning,
in which the choices of partitions in the first stage (interpreted as rules of thumb that bundle games
together) and the behaviors in the second stage (given the partitions) evolve. A rule-rational equilibrium
is act-rational if players play a Nash equilibrium in all games, and it is non-act-rational if at least one
of the players do not best reply in at least one game.
The following motivating example demonstrates that a non-act-rational equilibrium can strictly
Pareto dominate the set of of all act rational equilibrium payoff.
Example 1. Consider an environment with the two games shown in Table 1: The Prisoner’s Dilemma
(G1) and the Stag-Hunt Game (G2).
Table 1: Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag Hunt
G1 (Prisoner’s Dilemma)
C D
C 9,9 0,9.5
D 9.5,0 1,1
G2 (Stag Hunt)
C D
C 9,9 0,8.5
D 8.5,0 1,1
These two games are relatively “similar” in the sense that the maximal difference between the two
payoff matrices is 1. Note that in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, (D,D) is the unique Nash equilibrium, while
the Stag-Hunt game admits two pure Nash equilibria: (D,D) and the Pareto-dominant (C,C). In any
2Assuming a fixed set of action is without loss of generality; see Footnotes 6 and 9.
3In Section 7.2 we extend our results to a setup with partial observability of the opponent’s partition.
3act-rational equilibrium of this environment, players play the unique Nash equilibrium (D,D) in ω1.
Thus each player can achieve an expected (ex-ante) payoff of at most 5 in any act-rational equilibrium.
Consider the following non-act-rational equilibrium. Both players choose the coarse partition (i.e., bundle
together both games), play C on the equilibrium path, and play D (in both games) if any player deviated
while choosing his partition. This equilibrium yields both players a payoff of 9. Note that the coarse
partition in this example can be interpreted as if each player did not pay attention to small differences
in the payoffs (say, up to one utility point).
Section 4 presents additional motivating examples. Example 2 shows an environment in which players
choose a coarse partition that pays attention only to the sum of payoffs, and hence they implement an
outcome that strictly Pareto-dominates the set of act-rational payoffs in all games (and not only from the
ex-ante perspective). Example 3 presents an environment that admits only non-act-rational equilibria.
Finally, Examples 4 and 5 demonstrate that non-act-rational equilibria can fit experimentally observed
behaviors in the “Ultimatum game” and the “Chainstore paradox” (see Camerer, 2003, and the references
there).
In Section 5 we characterize rule-rational equilibria in various families of environments. An environ-
ment is redundant if all its games are strategically equivalent (Moulin & Vial, 1978). Note that such
games share the same set of correlated equilibria (Aumann, 1974). Our first results (Propositions 1-4)
show that rule rationality in redundant environments can only induce behavior that is consistent with the
correlated equilibria of the underlying games; moreover, if the redundant environment is large enough,
and each game has a small probability, then the correlated equilibrium of each underlying game can be
approximated by a rule-rational equilibrium.
Next, we study environments in which in each game the sum of the payoffs is constant. We show
that such constant-sum environments always admit an act-rational equilibrium. They may admit also
non-act-rational equilibria, but these equilibria are limited in two ways: they must yield the same ex-ante
expected payoff as the act-rational equilibrium, and they are not robust, i.e., they are not stable to a
perturbation that yields an arbitrarily small probability that the choice of partition is not observed by
the opponent. Examples 8-9 show that these properties need not hold if the games are strategically
zero-sum (Moulin & Vial, 1978).
Proposition 5 deals with environments in which each game admits a Pareto-dominant action profile,
and we show that such environments admit an act-rational equilibrium that strictly Pareto-dominates
all non-act-rational equilibria.4 Next we characterize (Proposition 1) a “folk theorem” result for environ-
ments in which a specific action profile is a Nash equilibrium in all games. This is followed by showing
that if a specific action is dominant for one of the players in all games in the environment, then the
environment admits only act-rational equilibria. Finally, we generalize Example 1 and show that if an
environment assigns high enough probability to game g∗ that admits strict equilibrium a∗ that dominates
another strict equilibrium, then there is a rule-rational equilibrium that bundles together all games that
have payoff matrices close enough to g∗, and players play a∗ in all these games.
In Section 6 we show the close relationship between the existence of act-rational equilibria and of
Stackelberg stability. A Nash equilibrium in a game is Stackelberg-stable if it yields both players at least
their mixed-action Stackelberg payoff (Mailath & Samuelson (2006)); that is, no player can guarantee a
higher payoff by being a Stackelberg leader, i.e., playing first, and having his chosen strategy observed by
his opponent before playing. A game is Stackelberg-stable if it admits a Stackelberg-stable equilibrium.
Examples of Stackelberg-stable games are constant-sum games, games with a Pareto-dominant action
4A similar result was obtained in the framework of value of information in Bassan et al. (2003).
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profile, and games in which both players have dominant actions. We first show that if all games in the
environment are Stackelberg-stable, then the environment admits an act-rational equilibrium. Second, we
show that for any Stackelberg-unstable game G∗, there is an environment in which only G∗ is Stackelberg-
unstable, and the environment does not admit an act-rational equilibrium. Finally, we show that any
act-rational equilibrium of a generic environment is preserved when a Stackelberg-stable game is added
to the environment with small enough probability.
We conclude the paper with a discussion of a few extensions and implications of our model (Section 7):
(1) we use our model to study the value of information (see the related literature in the following section)
and its relations to Stackelberg stability; (2) we extend the model to a setup of partial observability; (3)
we discuss the empirical predictions of our model; and (4) we present ideas for future research.
2 Related Literature
This paper is related to and inspired by three strands of literature (in addition to the literature commit-
ments mentioned earlier). The first strand presents an evolutionary foundation for seemingly irrational
behavior in strategic environments. Pioneered by Guth & Yaari (1992), the literature on the evolution
of preferences shows that if the preferences of an agent are observed by an opponent, then his subjective
preferences (which the agent maximizes) may differ from his material preferences (which determine his
fitness); see, e.g., Dekel et al. (2007); Winter et al. (2010) interprets these subjective preferences to
be “rational emotions”.5 This literature describes stable outcomes of an evolutionary process in which
subjective preferences evolve slowly, and behavior (given the subjective preferences) evolves at a faster
pace. Recently, a few papers have used a similar methodology to study the evolution of cognitive biases,
such as the “endowment effect” (Frenkel et al., 2012) and bounded forward-looking (Heller, 2013). In
this paper we adopt a similar approach, and study evolutionary foundations for ignoring the differences
between different games, and bundling them together in a single equivalence set.
The second strand of literature studies categorization. It is commonly accepted in the psychology
literature that people categorize the world around them in order to help the cognitively limited categorizer
to deal with the huge amount of information he obtains from his complex environment. Samuelson
(2001) presents a model of cognitively limited agents who bundle together different kinds of bargaining
games in order to free up cognitive resources for competitive tournament games. Jehiel (2005) models
players who bundle together different nodes in an extensive-form game, and best reply to aggregate
opponent’s behavior in this “analogy set.” Azrieli (2009) studies games with many players, and shows that
categorizing the opponents into a few groups can lead to efficient outcomes. Mohlin (2011) studies the
optimal categorization in prediction problems. Finally, Mengel (2012) studies a learning process in which
agents jointly learn which games to bundle together, and how to play in each partition element. The main
novelty of this paper relative to this existing literature is the study of the the strategic “commitment”
advantages of “observable” categorization, and the presentation of an equilibrium concept for classes of
games (rather than for specific games).
The third strand deals with the value of information. In a seminal paper, Blackwell (1953) shows
that for single-agent decision problems, more information for the agent is always better. This result can
also be extended to constant-sum games, but it is not true, in general, for non-constant-sum games. A
classical example of this is given in Akerlof (1970), which shows that providing the seller with private
information might render any trade impossible, and thereby reduce the welfare of both the seller and the
5Also related are the papers that study environments in which a player can choose a delegate (with different incentives)
to play on his behalf (see, e.g., Fershtman et al. (1991)).
5buyer; see additional examples in Kamien et al. (1990). A few papers characterize specific environments
in which information has positive value. Bassan et al. (2003) show that if all games have common
interests, then information has a (Pareto-)positive value: more information yields a Pareto-dominant
equilibrium (see also Lehrer et al. (2010)). In Section 7 we show that our model can be reinterpreted to
the above framework, and this yields interesting insights about the value of information.
3 Model
Throughout the paper we focus on two-player games and we use index i to denote one of the two players
and −i to denote his opponent. An environment is a finite set of possible two-player games and a
probability function according to which nature chooses the realized game. Formally:
Definition 1. An environment ((Ω, p) , A, u) is a tuple where:
• (Ω, p) is a finite probability space. That is, Ω is a finite set of states of nature, and p is a probability
function over Ω. Without loss of generality, we assume that p (ω) > 0 for each ω ∈ Ω.
• A = A1×A2, and each Ai is a finite set of pure actions for player i that are assumed to be available
to him at all states of nature.6
• u = Ω× A→ R2 is the payoff function that determines the payoff for each player at each state of
the world for each action profile.
We assume that both players evaluate random outcomes by using the von Neumann–Morgenstern ex-
pected utility extension of u, and, with a slight abuse of notation, we denote by u also this linear
extension. Observe that each state of nature ω induces a normal-form game (A, u (ω)) with a set of
actions A and a payoff function u.
Remark 1. For simplicity, we define only for environments with two players. However, all the definitions
and all the results can be extended to n-player environments in a straightforward way.
A partition over a set X is a set of non-empty subsets (partition elements) of X such that every
element in X is in exactly one of these subsets. Let ΠΩ denote the set of all partitions over Ω. A
(behavior) strategy of player i is a function si : Ω → ∆ (A) that assigns a mixed action to each state
of nature. Strategy si is pii-measurable (where pii ∈ ΠΩ) if si (ω) = si (ω′) for each two states in the
same partition element in pii. Let Si,pii be the set of pii-measurable (behavior) strategies of player i. Let
p¯i = {{ω} |ω ∈ Ω} denote the finest partition, and let pi = {Ω} denote the coarsest partition. Given a
partition pii ∈ ΠΩ and a state ω ∈ Ω, let pii (ω) be the partition element of pii that includes state ω.
Each environment induces a two-player two-stage meta-game:
1. At stage 1, each player i chooses a partition pii.
2. At stage 2, nature chooses the state ω ∈ Ω according to p, and each player i observes the chosen
partition profile (pi1, pi2) and his partition element pii (ω), and chooses an action ai ∈ Ai.
Remark 2.
6The assumption that a player has the same set of actions in all states is without loss of generality. If, originally, player
i has different actions in different states, this can be modeled by having Ai large enough, relabeling actions in different
states, and having several actions yielding the same outcome in some states.
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1. We interpret the partition chosen by a player as a behavioral phenomenon, and not necessarily
as a cognitive limitation. If two games belong to the same element of the partition it does not
necessarily mean that the player is unaware of the fact that these are two different games. It does,
however, say that the player is bounded to use the same strategy in both games. This could for
instance arise from attributing irrelevance to the difference between these games or because the
player is driven by some moral concern that leads him to use the same actions in both games. Note
that this interpretation of the role of the partition allows us to assume that while a player bundles
two games in the same element of the partition, he can still reasonably believe that his opponent
will treat these two games differently.
2. We view the observability of the opponent’s partition as a reduced-form model to a richer setup
where players either (1) communicate about the strategic setup before playing it, and this reveals
information about the opponent’s partition, or (2) observe each other’s past behavior or a trait that
is correlated with the partition. The assumption of perfect observability is taken for tractability,
and it is extended to partial observability in Section 7.2.
A meta-strategy is a behavior strategy in the meta-game.
Definition 2. A (behavior) meta-strategy for player i is a pair τi = (µi, σi), where:
1. µi ∈ ∆ (ΠΩ) is a distribution over the set of partitions.
2. σi : ΠΩ ×ΠΩ → Si,pii is a function that assigns a pii-measurable (behavioral) strategy for each pair
of partitions (pii, pi−i).
Given a meta-strategy profile τ = (τ1, τ2) and a state ω ∈ Ω, let xτ (ω) ∈ ∆ (A) be the interim
outcome of τ - the (possibly correlated) action profile that is induced in state ω given that both players
follow the meta-strategy profile τ . Let x¯τ ∈ ∆ (A) be the ex-ante outcome of τ , i.e., ∀a ∈ A x¯τ (a) =∑
ω∈Ω p (ω) ·xτ (ω) (a). Let C (µ) denote the support of the distribution µ. With some abuse of notation,
let pii also denote the distribution with mass 1 on partition pii.
A rule-rational equilibrium is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the two-stage meta-game. Formally:
Definition 3. A meta-strategy profile τ∗ = ((µ∗1, σ∗1) , (µ∗2, σ∗2)) is a rule-rational equilibrium if for each
player i:
1. Each strategy is a best reply in each subgame: for each partition profile (pi1, pi2) and for each
pii-measurable strategy s′i:∑
ω∈Ω
p (ω) · ui
(
σ∗i (pi1, pi2) (ω) , σ∗−i (pi1, pi2) (ω)
) ≥∑
ω∈Ω
p (ω) · ui
(
s′i (ω) , σ∗−i (pi1, pi2) (ω)
)
.
2. Each partition is a best reply: for each chosen partition pi∗i ∈ C (µ∗i ) and for each partition pi′i:∑
pi−i∈C(µ∗−i)
µ−i (pi−i) ·
∑
ω∈Ω
p (ω) · ui
(
σ∗i (pi∗i , pi−i) (ω) , σ∗−i (pi∗1 , pi−i) (ω)
) ≥
∑
pi∗−i∈C(µ∗−i)
µ−i (pi−i) ·
∑
ω∈Ω
p (ω) · ui
(
σ∗i (pi′i, pi−i) (ω) , σ∗−i (pi′i, pi−i) (ω)
)
.
Note that existence of rule-rational equilibria in any environment is immediately implied from the
well-known existence result of subgame-perfect equilibria in finite games (Selten (1975)).
7Remark 3.
1. We do not interpret the rule-rational equilibria to be the result of an explicit payoff maximization
of “hyper-rational” agents who choose optimal partitions. Rather, we see the optimization in both
stages as arising from an evolutionary process of social learning (similar to the literature of the
“indirect evolutionary approach”; see, e.g., Dekel et al., 2007). Each agent in the population has
a type that determines both his rules of thumb for bundling games together in a partition, and
also his behavior in the second stage (given the partition). New agents usually adopt one of the
existing types, and they are more likely to initiate the types of more successful agents. Every so
often, a few agents (“mutants”) may experiment with a new rule of thumb. It is well known that
in the long run, the surviving types that are used in a stable state are optimal (i.e, Nash equilibria;
see Nachbar, 1990). Recurrent entries of a few “mutants” and “trembles” of the incumbents imply
that behavior also off-the-equilibrium path is optimal (i.e., subgame perfect).7
2. A rule-rational equilibrium differs from any standard solution concept of the incomplete information
game induced by the environment (with a fixed information structure), as it allows players’ plays
to differ from best-replying in some states of nature. However, a rule-rational equilibrium can be
interpreted as a solution concept of the incomplete information game in which players can choose
(at the ex-ante stage) how much information to obtain (see Section 7.1 for further discussion).
The following definition divides the rule-rational equilibria into two disjoint subsets: (1) act-rational
equilibria in which both players play a Nash equilibrium in all states, and (2) non-act-rational equilibria
in which at least one of the players does not best reply in at least one state.
Definition 4. A rule-rational equilibrium ((µ∗1, σ∗1) , (µ∗2, σ∗2)) is act-rational if for each state ω ∈ Ω, and
for each chosen partition profile (pi∗1 , pi∗2) ∈ C (µ∗1)×C (µ∗2), the strategy profile (σ∗1 (pi∗1 , pi∗2) (ω) , σ∗2 (pi∗1 , pi∗2) (ω))
is a Nash equilibrium in the game (A, u (ω)) . A rule-rational equilibrium is non-act-rational if it is not
act-rational.
Remark 4.
1. Note that in an act-rational equilibrium a player is not required to play different actions in different
games, or to use the finest partition. Moreover, the induced interim outcome xτ (ω) need not be
a Nash equilibrium. However, it is immediate that the interim outcome in all states must be in
the convex hull of the set of Nash equilibria (because the realized partition profile may be used
as a random public signal to choose among the different Nash equilibria). Thus any act-rational
equilibrium can be implemented with each player choosing his finest partition, provided that players
have a rich enough source of “sunspots” to coordinate which Nash equilibrium they play.
2. In any non-act-rational equilibrium at least one of the players must not know his own payoff matrix
in some states. That is, it must be that there exist two states ω, ω′ and player i ∈ {1, 2}, such that
with positive probability ω and ω′ are in the same partition element of player i and ui (ω) 6= ui (ω′).
Otherwise, rule rationality would imply act rationality.
7It is well known that any evolutionarily stable strategy (Maynard-Smith & Price (1973)) is a subgame-perfect equi-
librium (see, e.g., Weibull, 1997). Evolutionary stability refines subgame perfection by also requiring stability against a
small group of “mutants.” We choose to use subgame perfection as the solution concept rather than evolutionary stability
(or one of its adaptations to extensive-form games, such as Selten, 1983’s notion of limit ESS), for the following reasons:
(1) a subgame-perfect equilibrium is a simpler solution concept that is more familiar to readers and it suffices to yield
most of the insights of the analysis, and (2) unlike evolutionarily stable strategies, subgame-perfect equilibria exist in all
environments. We leave for future research the application of evolutionary stability in this setup.
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4 Motivating Examples
This section includes four motivating examples. Example 2 shows an environment in which a coarse
partition that pays attention only to the sum of payoffs yields a Pareto-dominant outcome in all states
(relative to the set of act-rational payoffs). Example 3 demonstrates an environment that does not
admit act-rational equilibria. Finally, in Section 4.3 we demonstrate that non-act-rational equilibria
can fit experimentally observed behavior in the “Ultimatum game” (Example 4) and the “Chainstore
paradox” (Example 5).
4.1 Non-act Rationality Pareto-dominates Act Rationality
Our first example demonstrates that non-act-rational equilibria may yield a strict Pareto improvement
in all states relative to the best outcome that can be achieved by act-rational equilibria .
Example 2. Let Ω = {ω1, ω2}, and let A and each ωi be described as in Table 2.
Table 2: Payoffs of Prisoner’s Dilemma with Two Defections
ω1
C D1 D2
C 9,9 0,10 2,8
D1 10,0 1,1 1,1
D2 8,2 1,1 1,1
ω2
C D1 D2
C 9,9 2,8 0,10
D1 8,2 1,1 1,1
D2 10,0 1,1 1,1
The interpretation of this environment is a Prisoner’s Dilemma with two options to “testify against
the partner” (D1 and D2), such that in each state of the world one of these actions is better for the
defector. Observe that both games (A, u (ω1)) and (A, u (ω2)) admit a unique Nash equilibrium payoff
of (1, 1). This implies that (1, 1) is the unique act-rational equilibrium payoff. This payoff can be
implemented by the following act-rational equilibrium: both players choose the finest partition, and
both play 0.5 · D1 + 0.5 · D2 in both states (for any realized partition profile). One can see that the
following meta-strategy profile is a rule-rational equilibrium for every 110 < p (ω1) <
9
10 :
• Coarse partitions for each player (pii = pi).
• Playing (C,C) on the equilibrium path.
• Both players playing 0.5 ·D1 + 0.5 ·D2 if any player deviated by choosing a different partition.
Observe that this rule-rational equilibrium induces a payoff of 9 for each player, which strictly Pareto-
dominates the unique act-rational equilibrium payoff of 1 in both games. Further observe that the coarse
partition in this example can be interpreted as if each player knows only the sum of the payoffs (which
is the same in both states), but not how this sum is divided among the players when exactly one of the
players plays C.
4.2 An Environment Without Act-rational equilibria
The following example demonstrates an environment that does not admit any act-rational equilibrium.
Example 3. Let Ω = {ω1, ω2}, and let A and each u (ωi) be described in Table 3.
4.3 Environments with Extensive-form Games 9
Table 3: Environment with Act-Rational Equilibria
ω1
L R
C 9,9 0,7
D1 10,0 1,1
D2 7,0 -2,1
ω2
L R
C 9,9 0,7
D1 7,0 -2,1
D2 10,0 1,1
We now show that for every 13 < p (ω1) <
2
3 , the game admits no act-rational equilibrium. This
implies that this is what the players must play in any act-rational equilibrium, and that each player
obtains a payoff of 1. However, if player 1 deviates to the coarsest partition pi, then for both possible
partitions of player 2, the induced Bayesian subgame admits a unique Nash equilibrium in which the
players play (C,L) and this yields both players a payoff of 9. This shows that the environment does not
admit any act-rational equilibrium. An example for a non-act-rational equilibrium in this environment
is as follows: let pi∗1 = pi, pi∗2 = pi, and let σ∗ be equal to (C,L) on-the-equilibrium path or if player 2
deviated to pi; otherwise (i.e., if player 1 deviated to pi) let σ∗ be equal to (D1, R) in ω1 and (D2, R) in
ω2 . Observe that each game ωi admits a unique Nash equilibrium: (D1, R) in ω1 and (D2, R) in ω2.
4.3 Environments with Extensive-form Games
To simplify the presentation of the general model in Section 3 we defined an environment consisting
of normal-form games. The following two examples differ somewhat in that in each state of nature
players interact in sequential games. Accordingly, with some abuse of notation, in this subsection we
have extensive-form games in each state of nature, and we require a rule-rational equilibrium to be a
subgame-perfect equilibrium (given the extensive-form representation of the games).
4.3.1 Ultimatum Game
The following example describes a situation in which players may either play an Ultimatum game, or a
bargaining game in which the responder can make a counteroffer.
Example 4. Consider an environment that includes two states Ω = {ω1, ω2} with equal probability. In
both states the two risk-neutral8 players have to agree how to divide 1 dollar between them. In ω1 they
play the Ultimatum game: player 1 offers a division, which player 2 either accepts or rejects; in the case
of rejection both players get nothing. In ω2 they play a two-stage sequential bargaining game: at stage
1 player 1 makes an offer; then player 2 either accepts the offer or makes a counteroffer; in the case of a
counteroffer, player 1 may either accept or reject it; in the case of rejection both players get nothing.9
One can see that the game admits two pure rule-rational equilibria:
1. Act-rational equilibrium - Both players choose the finest partition. Player 1 offers 0 to the responder
in ω1 (Ultimatum) and 1 in ω2. Player 2 accepts these offers (and rejects any lower offer off the
equilibrium path).
2. Non-act-rational equilibrium - Player 2 chooses the coarsest partition. Player 1 may either choose
the finest or the coarsest partition. Player 1 offers the responder 0.5 in both games. Player 2
8Results are qualitatively the same for risk-averse players and for having a discount factor.
9As stated above, the players have different sets of actions in each state. However, this can also be modeled with the
same set of actions in each state. Specifically, one may assume that in both states the players have the richer set of actions
of state ω2, and that in state ω1 the counteroffer of player 2 leads to a payoff of 0 for each player regardless of player 1’s
final action (accepting or rejecting).
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accepts this offer (and rejects any lower offer off the equilibrium path).
Observe that both equilibria yield both players the same ex-ante payoff (0.5 for each player). The second
equilibrium fits the stylized fact that people tend to reject offers that are substantially lower than half
the pie when playing the ultimatum game.
4.3.2 Chainstore Paradox
The following example shows that a non-act-rational equilibrium, in which the monopolist chooses not to
pay attention to the exact number of potential entrants, implies a reputation-like behavior that fits the
experimentally observed behavior, which cannot be supported by act-rational equilibria. In this example
we extend the model by allowing the set of states to be countable (and not finite as in our general model).
Example 5. Consider an environment with a countable number of states: Ω = N. Let p be any
distribution satisfying: (1) full support - p (ω) > 0 ∀ω ∈ N, and (2) “continuation” probability that
is high enough - ∀k ∈ N, p (ω = k|ω ≥ k) < 2/3. In particular these requirements are satisfied by any
geometric distribution with high enough expectation. The state ω describes the number of potential
competitors that the monopolist (player 1) faces. The game lasts ω rounds. To simplify notation and
fit our two-player setup, we represent all potential competitors by a single “impatient” player 2, the
competitor. At each round, player 2 chooses In or Out. Out yields a stage payoff of 5 to the monopolist
and 1 to the competitor. If he chose In, then the monopolist chooses Fight or Adapt. Fight yields stage
payoff of 0 to both players, and Adapt yields 2 to both players. The total game payoff of the monopolist
is the discounted sum of stage payoffs for some high enough discount factor 0 << λ ≤ 1. The total
payoff of the competitor is a discounted sum of the payoffs with a low discount factor 0 ≤ λ << 1.
In the classical setup in which the monopolist knows the state of nature, the game admits a unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium: the competitor always plays In, and the monopolist always plays Adapt.
In our setup, however, there is an additional non-act-rational equilibrium that yields a better payoff
to the monopolist. In this equilibrium the monopolist chooses the coarsest partition, and plays Fight
following any entry. The competitor chooses the finest partition and plays Out, unless he observes an
out-of-equilibrium history in which the monopolist played Adapt.
5 Results for Specific Families of Environments
This section characterizes rule-rational equilibria in families of environments that satisfy certain prop-
erties. In Section 5.1 we show that rule-rational equilibria are closely related to correlated equilibria in
environments that include strategically equivalent games. In Section 5.2 we show that environments that
only include constant-sum games essentially admit only act-rational equilibria (but this is not true for
the larger family of strategically zero-sum games). Section 5.3 shows that environments with common
interests admit a Pareto-dominant act-rational equilibrium. In Section 5.4 we characterize rule-rational
equilibria in environments in which a specific action profile is a Nash equilibrium in all games. Finally, in
Section 5.5 we study environments that assign high enough probability to a game with an undominated,
strict equilibrium.
5.1 Redundant Environments
Recall (Moulin & Vial, 1978), that two games with the same set of actions, (A, u) and (A, u˜), are
strategically equivalent if for each player i ∈ {1, 2}, for each mixed action xi ∈ ∆ (Ai), and for each two
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mixed actions x−i, x′−i ∈ ∆ (A−i), ui (xi, x−i) ≥ ui
(
xi, x
′
−i
) ⇔ u˜i (xi, x−i) ≥ u˜i (xi, x′−i). That is, each
player has the same preference over his set of mixed actions given any mixed action of his opponent.
It is immediate to see that strategically equivalent games admit the same sets of Nash equilibria and
correlated equilibria. An environment is redundant if it includes only strategically equivalent games.
That is, for each ω, ω′ ∈ Ω, the games (A, u (ω)) and (A, u (ω′)) are strategically equivalent.
Recall that a correlated equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of an extended game that includes a pre-
play stage in which each player observes a private signal (and the signals may be correlated). Formally:
Definition 5. (Aumann, 1974, as reformulated in Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994) A correlated equilibrium
of a two-player normal-form game G = (A, u) is a tuple ζ =
((
Ω˜, p˜
)
, (p˜i1, p˜i2) , (η˜1, η˜2)
)
that consists of:
• A finite probability space (Ω˜, p˜),
• A partition profile (p˜i1, p˜i2) ∈ ΠΩ˜ ×ΠΩ˜,
• A strategy profile (η˜1, η˜2), where each η˜i : Ω→ Ai is a p˜ii-measurable strategy,
such that for every player i and every pii-measurable strategy η′i : Ω→ Ai, we have∑
ω∈Ω˜
p˜ (ω) · ui (η˜i (ω) , η˜−i (ω)) ≥
∑
ω∈Ω˜
p˜ (ω) · ui (η′i (ω) , η˜−i (ω)) .
The following example demonstrates that a redundant environment that includes only copies of the
same game, may admit a rule-rational equilibrium with a payoff outside the convex hull of the set of
Nash equilibrium payoffs.
Example 6. Consider the following redundant environment: Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3}, p is uniform, and (A, u)
is the same “Chicken” (or “Hawk-Dove”) game in all states (see Table 4). Consider the following rule-
Table 4: Payoffs of the “Chicken” Game in All States
C D
C 3,3 1,4
D 4,1 0,0
rational equilibrium: player 1 chooses partition pi∗1 = {{ω1, ω2, }ω3} and player 2 chooses partition
pi∗2 = {ω1, {ω2, ω3}}. On the equilibrium path each player plays C when he does not know the exact
state of nature, and plays D otherwise. Off the equilibrium path, if a player chooses any other partition,
the deviator plays C and his opponent plays D.10 This rule-rational equilibrium (which “imitates” a
correlated equilibrium of the “Chicken” game) yields each player a payoff of 8/3 (and this is outside the
convex hull of the set of Nash equilibria).
The following proposition shows that redundant environments can only induce behavior that is con-
sistent with correlated equilibria. Formally:
Proposition 1. Let ((Ω, p) , A, u) be a redundant environment. Then:
1. Any Nash equilibrium can be induced by an act-rational equilibrium.
10For brevity, throughout the proofs in this paper we specify only the strategies after a single player deviates. The
play following simultaneous deviations of both players at the partition stage can be determined arbitrarily as any Nash
equilibrium of the induced subgame.
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2. The induced aggregate action profile of every rule-rational equilibrium is always a correlated equi-
librium (of every game in the environment).
Proof.
1. Let x ∈ ∆ (A1) ×∆ (A2) be a Nash equilibrium of the games (A, u (ω))ω∈Ω. It is immediate that
any arbitrary choice of partitions, followed by playing x in all states (regardless of the chosen
partitions), yields an act-rational equilibrium.
2. Let τ∗ = ((µ∗1, σ∗1) , (µ∗2, σ∗2)) be a rule-rational equilibrium. Intuitively, a mediator can “mimic”
the choice of the state of nature and of the partition that each player uses, and inform each player
about his partition and about the partition element that includes the state. Formally, we construct
a correlated equilibrium ζτ∗ =
((
Ω˜, p˜
)
, (p˜i1, p˜i2) , (η˜1, η˜2)
)
(of every game in the environment) as
follows. Let Ω˜ = Ω×ΠΩ ×ΠΩ, and let p˜ (ω, pi1, pi2) = p (ω) · µ∗1 (pi1) · µ∗2 (pi2). For each player i, let
p˜ii ((ω0, pi1, pi2)) = {(ω, pi1, pi2) |ω ∈ pii (ω0)}, and let η˜i (ω0) = σ∗i (pi1, pi2) (ω0). The fact that τ∗ is a
rule-rational equilibrium immediately implies that ζτ∗ is a correlated equilibrium.
The following proposition shows that the converse is also true: any correlated equilibrium (which is
not dominated by the set of Nash equilibria) can be induced by a redundant environment that includes
several copies of the same game.
Definition 6. A correlated equilibrium is undominated if for each player i there exists a Nash equilibrium
that yields player i a weakly worse payoff.
Proposition 2. For every undominated correlated equilibrium ζ in game (A, u0), there exists a redundant
environment ((Ω, p) , A, u) and a rule-rational equilibrium that induces ζ as the aggregate outcome.
Proof. Let ζ =
((
Ω˜, p˜
)
, (p˜i1, p˜i2) , (η1, η2)
)
be a correlated equilibrium of the game (A, u0). Consider the
following redundant environment ((Ω, p) , A, u): (Ω, p) =
(
Ω˜, p˜
)
and u (ω) = u0 in all states. Consider
the following strategy profile τζ = ((µ1, σ1) , (µ2, σ2)) : each µi assigns mass 1 to p˜ii, and σi = ηi if the
realized partition profile is (p˜i1, p˜i2). If player i deviates and plays a different partition, both players play
in all states the Nash equilibrium that yields player i a worse payoff. It is immediate to see that τζ is a
rule-rational equilibrium.
Finally, the following proposition shows that the implementation of correlated equilibria does not de-
pend on using “tailored” probability distributions. Specifically, it shows that any undominated correlated
equilibrium can be approximately induced by any large enough “atomless” environment (an environment
in which each state has a small probability). Formally:
Definition 7. Given  ≥ 0, a meta-strategy profile τ∗ = ((µ∗1, σ∗1) , (µ∗2, σ∗2)) is a rule-rational -
equilibrium if for each player i:
1. Each strategy is an -best reply in each sub-game: for each partition-profile (pi1, pi2) and for each
pii-measurable strategy s′i:∑
ω∈Ω
p (ω) · ui
(
σ∗i (pi1, pi2) (ω) , σ∗−i (pi1, pi2) (ω)
) ≥∑
ω∈Ω
p (ω) · ui
(
s′i (ω) , σ∗−i (pi1, pi2) (ω)
)− .
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2. Each partition is an -best reply: for each chosen partition pi∗i ∈ C (µ∗i ) and for each partition pi′i:∑
pi−i∈C(µ∗−i)
µ−i (pi−i) ·
∑
ω∈Ω
p (ω) · ui
(
σ∗i (pi∗i , pi−i) (ω) , σ∗−i (pi∗1 , pi−i) (ω)
) ≥
∑
pi∗−i∈C(µ∗−i)
µ−i (pi−i) ·
∑
ω∈Ω
p (ω) · ui
(
σ∗i (pi′i, pi−i) (ω) , σ∗−i (pi′i, pi−i) (ω)
)− .
Definition 8. Given a normal-form game (A, u) and  ≥ 0, two correlated action profiles x, y ∈ ∆ (A)
are -close if maxa∈A (|x (a)− y (a)|) ≤ .
Definition 9. Given a normal-form game (A, u0), let u¯0 = maxa,a′∈A,i∈{1,2} |ui (a)− ui (a′)| be the
maximal difference between any two values in the payoff matrix.
Proposition 3. Let (A, u0) be a game, let ζ be an undominated correlated equilibrium in (A, u0), and
let  > 0. Let ((Ω, p) , A, u0) be a redundant environment that satisfies p (ω) < /u¯0 ∀ω ∈ Ω. Then, the
environment ((Ω, p) , A, u0) admits a rule-rational -equilibrium that induces an ex-ante outcome, which
is -close to ζ.
Proof. Let xζ ∈ ∆ (A) be the outcome of the correlated equilibrium ζ. It is immediate that there exists a
function g : Ω→ A that identifies each set of states with an action profile in A, such that for each action
profile a ∈ A, |p ({ω|g (ω) = a})− xζ (a)| < /u¯0. Let gi (ω) : Ω → Ai be the function that identifies
each state with the induced action of player i (i.e, g (ω) = (g1 (ω) , g2 (ω)). For each player i let partition
pii be defined as follows: pii (ω0) = {ω|gi (ω) = gi (ω0)}. Consider the following meta-strategy profile
τζ, = ((pi1, σ1) , (pi2, σ2)): on the equilibrium path σi (pi1, pi2) (ω) = gi (ω), and if player i deviates and
chooses a different partition, then both agents play in all states the Nash equilibrium that yields player
i a worse payoff. It is immediate to see that τζ, is a rule-rational -equilibrium that yields an outcome
that is /u¯0 close to ζ.
5.2 Constant-sum and Strategically Zero-sum Environments
Environment ((Ω, p) , A, u) is constant-sum if for each state ω ∈ Ω, the game (A, u (ω)) is a constant-sum
game. For each state ω ∈ Ω, let v (ω) be the interim value of the game (A, u (ω)), and let v (Ω) = ∑ p (ω)·
v (ω) be the ex-ante value of the environment. The following example shows a zero-sum environment
that admits a non-act-rational equilibrium.
Example 7. Let Ω = {ω1, ω2}, p (ω1) = 0.5, and let A and each u (ω) be defined according to Table
5. Consider the following meta-strategy profile. Both players choose the coarsest partition (∀i pi∗i = pi)
Table 5: Payoffs of a Zero-sum Environment
ω1
L R
T 1,-1 0,0
D 0,0 0,0
ω2
L R
T -1,1 0,0
D 0,0 0,0
and they both play (T, L) on the equilibrium path, and (R,D) off the equilibrium path (if any player
deviated and chose a different partition). It is immediate to see that this profile is a non-act-rational
equilibrium. Note that this equilibrium yields the players in each state ωi a payoff different from the
interim value v (ωi) = 0, while the ex-ante value, v (Ω) = 0, is unchanged.
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Our next result shows that rule rationality is very limited in constant-sum environments. Specifically,
any rule-rational equilibrium induces the same ex-ante payoff as the act-rational equilibria and it is
not robust, in the sense that stability is destroyed if there is an arbitrarily small probability that the
opponent may overlook a deviation at the partition stage. Formally, our notion of robustness assumes
that when a player deviates while choosing a partition, then: (1) with very high probability the deviation
is observed by the opponent and the players follow the off-equilibrium-path strategies, and (2) with very
low probability the deviation is unobserved by the opponent, and the deviating player (who is aware of
the fact that his deviation was unobserved) can play any strategy that is consistent with his partition.
Definition 10. Rule-rational equilibrium τ∗ = ((µ∗1, σ∗1) , (µ∗2, σ∗2)) is robust if there exists ¯ > 0 such
that for each  < ¯, for each player i, for each chosen partition pi∗i ∈ C (µ∗i ), and for each partition pi′i:∑
pi∗−i∈C(µ∗−i)
µ−i (pi−i) ·
∑
ω∈Ω
p (ω) · ui
(
σ∗i (pi∗1 , pi∗2) (ω) , σ∗−i (pi∗1 , pi∗2) (ω)
) ≥
∑
pi∗−i∈C(µ∗−i)
µ−i (pi−i) ·
(
(1− ) ·
∑
ω∈Ω
p (ω) · ui
(
σ∗i
(
pi′i, pi
∗
−i
)
(ω) , σ∗−i
(
pi′i, pi
∗
−i
)
(ω)
)
+ ·
∑
ω∈Ω
p (ω) · ui
(
maxσi∈Si,pi′iσi (ω) , σ
∗
−i (pi∗1 , pi∗2) (ω)
))
.
Proposition 4. Let ((Ω, p) , A, u) be a constant-sum environment. Then:
1. The environment admits an act-rational equilibrium.
2. All rule-rational equilibria yield the same ex-ante payoff, v (Ω).
3. Any non-act-rational equilibrium is not robust.
Proof.
1. Consider the meta-strategy in which each player chooses the finest partition and then plays a
minimax strategy in each game (regardless of the partition his opponent chose). It it immediate
that this meta-strategy profile is an act-rational equilibrium.
2. This is immediately implied by the fact each player may deviate by choosing the finest partition,
and playing a minimax strategy in each game, which yields an ex-ante payoff of at least v (Ω).
3. For every  > 0, a player can strictly earn by deviating from a rule-rational equilibrium into
choosing the finest partition, and playing a minimax strategy in each game. The deviator will earn
the same ex-ante payoff if the deviation is observed, and will earn a strictly higher payoff otherwise
(as there is a state in which with positive probability the players do not play a Nash equilibrium,
and one of the player can earn by best-replying to its opponent’s play).
Recall (Moulin & Vial, 1978) that a game is strategically zero-sum if it is strategically equivalent
to a zero-sum game. An environment ((Ω, p) , A, u) is strategically zero-sum if for each state ω ∈ Ω,
the game (A, u (ω)) is strategically zero-sum. Note that each constant-sum environment is strategically
zero-sum, but the converse is not necessarily true. The following two examples demonstrate that all parts
of Proposition 4 may fail in strategically zero-sum environments. Example 8 demonstrates a strategically
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zero-sum environment with a robust non-act-rational equilibrium that ex-ante strictly Pareto-dominates
the unique act-rational equilibrium payoff.
Example 8. Let Ω = {ω1, ω2}, p (ω1) = 0.5, and let A and each u (ω) be defined as in Table 6. First,
Table 6: Payoffs of a Strategically Zero-sum Environment
ω1
L R
T 2,-1 0,0
D 0,0 0,0
ω2
L R
T -1,2 0,0
D 0,0 0,0
note that each game is strategically zero-sum. Specifically, the first (second) game A, u (ω1) (A, u (ω2))
is derived from the first (second) zero-sum game of Example 7 by multiplying the payoff matrix of player
1 (player 2) by two. Next, note that each game admits a unique Nash equilibrium payoff of (0, 0). This
implies that any act-rational equilibrium admits an interim payoff (0, 0) in both states. Finally, consider
the following meta-strategy profile. Both players choose the coarsest partition (∀i pi∗i = pi) and they both
play (T, L) on the equilibrium path, and (R,D) off the equilibrium path (if any player has deviated and
chosen a different partition). It is immediate that this profile is a non-act-rational equilibrium, and that
it yields each player an ex-ante payoff of (0.5, 0.5), which Pareto-dominates the payoff of each act-rational
equilibrium.
The following example demonstrates a strategically zero-sum environment that does not admit any
act-rational equilibrium.
Example 9. Let Ω = {ω1, ω2}, p (ω1) = 0.5, and let A and each u (ω) be defined as in Table 7. First,
Table 7: Payoffs of a Strategically-Zero-Sum Environment
ω1
L R
T 0,0 0,0
D 3,-3 4,-4
ω2
L R
T 11,-1 -1,1
D 9,1 1,-1
note that each game is strategically zero-sum: (A, u (ω1)) is a zero-sum game, and (A, u (ω2)) is derived
from a zero-sum Matching Pennies game by adding 10 to the first column of the matrix payoff of player
1 (Moulin & Vial, 1978 show that this implies that (A, u (ω2)) is strategically zero-sum). Next, note
that each game admits a unique Nash equilibrium: (L,D) in ω1 and ((0.5, 0.5) , (0.5, 0.5)) in ω2. These
action profiles yield player 1 an ex-ante payoff of 4 = 0.5 ∗ 3 + 0.5 ∗ 5. Assume to the contrary that
these action profiles were the interim outcome of an act-rational equilibrium. Note that player 1 can
deviate by choosing the coarsest partition. Given this deviation, playing D is a strictly dominant action
for player 1, and this implies that playing(D,L) is the unique Nash equilibrium of the induced game,
and that it yields player 1 an ex-ante payoff of 6. This contradicts the assumption that an act-rational
equilibrium exists.
5.3 Environments with Common Interests
A game (A, u0) has common interests (Aumann & Sorin, 1989) if there is an action profile a˜ ∈ A
that Pareto-dominates all other action profiles: ∀i ∈ {1, 2} , a ∈ A, ui (a˜) > ui (a). An environment
((Ω, p) , A, u) has common interests if it includes only games with common interests. The following
example shows that rule-rational equilibria may exist in environments with common interests.
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Example 10. Let Ω = {ω1, ω2}, and let A and each u (ωi) be defined as in Table 8. One can see that
Table 8: Payoffs of an Environment with Common Interests
ω1
L R
T 5,5 0,0
M 6,6 0,0
D 0,0 1,1
ω2
L R
T 5,5 0,0
M 0,0 0,0
D 0,0 1,1
the following meta-strategy profile is a non-act-rational equilibrium for every p (ω1) < 5/6: the players
choose the coarsest partition (pii = pi) and play (T, L) on the equilibrium path, and (D,R) if any player
deviated by choosing a different partition.
The following proposition shows that rule rationality is very limited in environments with common
interests, in the sense that any rule-rational equilibrium is strictly Pareto-dominated by an act-rational
equilibrium.11 The proposition is related to an existing result of Bassan et al. (2003), which shows that
information has a (Pareto) positive value if each game has common interests.
Proposition 5. Let ((Ω, p) , A, u) be an environment with common interests. Then there exists an
act-rational equilibrium that strictly Pareto-dominates all non-act-rational equilibria.
Proof. It is immediate that the meta-strategy profile in which players choose the finest partition and
then play the Pareto-optimal action profile in every game is an act-rational equilibrium. Consider any
non-act-rational equilibrium. This equilibrium induces in some ω0 ∈ Ω a profile that is not a Nash
equilibrium. The fact that each game has common interests implies that the interim payoff of the non-
act-rational equilibrium is weakly dominated by the interim payoff of the above act-rational equilibrium,
and that it is strictly dominated in ω0.
5.4 Uniform-profile Environments
The following simple claim deals with environments with a uniform Nash equilibrium, i.e., with envi-
ronments in which the same mixed action profile is a Nash equilibrium in all states. It shows that such
environments admit an act-rational equilibrium in which the above action profile is played in all states.
Formally:
Claim 1. Let ((Ω, p) , A, u) be an environment, and let x ∈ ∆ (A) be a mixed action profile that is a Nash
equilibrium in all states. The the environment admits an act-rational equilibrium in which the players
choose the coarsest partitions and play x in all states.
Proof. It is immediate that the following meta-strategy profile is a rule-rational equilibrium: both players
choose the coarsest partition pi, and play mixed action x regardless of the realized partition profile.
The following proposition shows that if an environment admits a uniform dominant action for one of
the players, then the environment admits only act-rational equilibria. Formally:
Proposition 6. Let ((Ω, p) , A, u) be an environment with a player i ∈ {1, 2} and an action ai ∈ Ai that
is strictly dominant in all states. Then the environment admits only act-rational equilibria.
11In addition, one can show that all the non-act-rational equilibria in common-interest environments do not satisfy the
forward-induction refinement (Govindan & Wilson (2008)), while the Pareto-dominant act-rational equilibrium satisfies it.
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Proof. Let ai ∈ Ai be the strictly dominant action for player i in all games. It is immediate that the
following meta-strategy profile is an act-rational equilibrium: both players choose the finest partition,
player i plays ai in each state (also off the equilibrium path), and player −i best-replies to action ai
in each game. Any strategy profile that induces a different interim outcome than playing ai by player
i and best-replying to ai in each state by player −i is not a rule-rational equilibrium because: (1) if
player i plays with positive probability a different action in some state, then he can strictly earn more
by deviating and playing ai in all states; and (2) if player i always plays ai but his opponent does not
best-reply to ai in some state, then player −i can earn strictly more by deviating to the finest partition
and best-replying to ai in all states.
5.5 Environments with an Undominated Strict Equilibrium
In this section we consider an environment that includes a game g∗ with a strict equilibrium a that
dominates other strict equilibria. The first result shows that if the other games in the environment
have payoff matrices that are close enough to g∗, and if the probability of g∗ is large enough, then the
environment admits a rule-rational equilibrium in which players bundle all the similar games together
by choosing the coarsest partition and then playing a in all states. Note that if there is a state in which
a is not a Nash equilibrium, then this is a non-act-rational equilibrium. Formally:
Definition 11. Let δ > 0. A pure action profile a in a game (A, u) is a δ-strict Nash equilibrium if for
each player i and each action bi ∈ Ai, ui (a) ≥ ui (bi, a−i)+ δ.
Proposition 7. Let , δ > 0. Let (A, u0) be a game with δ-strict equilibria (a, b1, b2) such that ∀i ∈ {1, 2},
ui (a) > ui (bi)+δ. Let ((Ω, p) , A, u) be an environment such that: (1) it includes game (A, u0): ∃ω0 ∈ Ω
such that u (ω0) = u0; (2) the payoff matrices in all states are -close to uo: ∀ω ∈ Ω, a ∈ A i ∈ {1, 2} :∣∣ui (ω) (a)− ui0 (a)∣∣ ≤ ; and (3) p (ω0) ≥ −δ . Then the environment admits a rule-rational equilibrium
in which players choose the coarsest partition and play a in all states.
Proof. Consider the following meta-strategy profile. The players choose the coarsest partition and play
a. If player i deviates and chooses a different partition, then the players play profile bi in the partition
element that includes ω0, and they play an arbitrary equilibrium in the subgame that is induced by the
choice of partitions and by fixing the play of profile bi in ω0. Note that any unilateral deviation in the
partition element that includes ω0 yields the deviator a loss of at least δ utility points in ω0 and a profit
of at most − δ in any other state. Thus, this deviation yields an expected profit of at most(
1− − δ

)
· (− δ)− − δ
δ
· δ = δ

· − δ = 0.
This implies that the above strategy is an equilibrium of the subgame that is induced by the chosen
partitions also without fixing profile bi in ω0. Observe that a player who deviates at the partition stage
loses at least δ in ω0 and gains at most − δ in any other state; thus the maximal profit from a deviation
from the meta-strategy profile is (
1− − δ

)
· (− δ)− − δ

· δ = 0.
This implies that the above meta-strategy profile is a rule-rational equilibrium.
The following corollary shows that if g∗ (a game with a strict equilibrium a that dominates other
strict equilibria) has high enough probability, then the environment admits a rule-rational equilibrium
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in which players bundle all the other “unlikely” games with the prominent game g∗, and play a in all
games. Formally:
Corollary 1. Let (A, u0) be a game with strict equilibria (a, b1, b2) such that ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ui (a) > ui (bi).
Then there exists 0 < p0 < 1 such that each environment ((Ω, p) , A, u) that satisfies ω0 ∈ Ω, u (ω0) = u0,
and p (ω0) ≥ p0, admits a rule-rational equilibrium in which players choose the coarsest partition and
play a in all states.
Proof. Let δ > 0 be small enough such that: (1) the profiles (a, b1, b2) are δ-strict equilibria in game
(A, u0), (2) for each player i, ui (a) − ui (bi) > δ. Let  > 0 be large enough such that all games are
-close to g∗: ∀ω ∈ Ω, a1 ∈ A1 , a2 ∈ A2 i ∈ {1, 2} ∣∣ui (a1, a2)− ui0 (a1, a2)∣∣ ≤ . Let p0 = −δ . Then
proposition 7 implies that there is a rule-rational equilibrium in which the players choose the coarsest
partition, and play a in all states.
6 Stackelberg Stability and Act Rationality
This section shows that the existence of act-rational equilibria is closely related to the question of
whether the Nash equilibria of the games in the environment are stable against the possibility that one
of the players becomes a “Stackelberg” leader and commits in advance to a specific strategy. At the
end of Section 2 we discussed the implications of the results of this section for the study of the value of
information.
Given mixed action xi ∈ ∆ (Ai) of player i in a normal-form game G = (A, u), let BR (xi) ⊆ A−i be
the set of (pure) best replies of player −i to xi. Let vi
(
xi
)
= minx−i∈BR(xi) ui
(
xi, x−i
)
be the payoff that
player i can guarantee himself when playing xi before his opponent plays (under the assumption that his
opponent best-replies to the player’s commitment). Let v¯i (G) = maxxi∈∆(Ai) vi
(
xi
)
be the payoff that
player i can guarantee when playing as a Stackelberg leader (called a mixed-action Stackelberg payoff in
Mailath & Samuelson (2006)). Let NE (G) be the set of Nash equilibrium payoff vectors in G.
We say that a Nash equilibrium is Stackelberg-stable if no player can guarantee a higher payoff by
being a Stackelberg leader. Formally:
Definition 12. A Nash equilibrium payoff vector u ∈ NE (G) is Stackelberg-stable if for each player i,
v¯i (G) ≤ ui.
A game is Stackelberg-stable if it admits at least one Stackelberg-stable equilibrium, and it is Stackelberg-
unstable otherwise. The following fact shows a few simple families of Stackelberg-stable games. In
particular, both constant-sum games and optimal-profile games have this property.
Fact 1. Each of the following games are Stackelberg-stable.
1. Constant-sum games (all equilibria are stable).
2. Optimal-profile games (the Pareto-dominant equilibrium is stable).
3. Games in which both players have a strictly dominant action, e.g., Prisoner’s Dilemma (the unique
equilibrium is stable).
The following propositions show the close relation between act-rational equilibria and Stackelberg-
stable games. The first proposition shows that if all games are Stackelberg-stable, then an act-rational
equilibrium exists.
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Proposition 8. If every game in the environment is Stackelberg-stable, then the environment admits an
act-rational equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the following meta-strategy profile. Each player chooses the finest partition, and the
players play on the equilibrium path a Stackelberg-stable equilibrium in each game. If any player devi-
ates to a different partition, then the players play a Nash equilibrium of the induced subgame, such that
the deviating player earns weakly less than its payoff on the equilibrium path. The induced subgame
admits such a Nash equilibrium because otherwise the deviating player would have a strictly profitable
Stackelberg commitment in at least one game in the environment, and this would contradict our assump-
tion that players play Stackelberg-stable equilibria in all states. The above argument implies that this
meta-strategy profile is an act-rational equilibrium.
The following proposition shows that a single Stackelberg-unstable equilibrium is enough to prevent
the existence of an act-rational equilibrium in the environment. Formally:
Proposition 9. For any Stackelberg-unstable game G = (A, u0), there exists an environment such that:
(1) it includes only (A, u0) and Stackelberg-stable games, and (2) it does not admit any act-rational
equilibrium.
Proof. For each Nash equilibrium payoff v ∈ NE (G) in G, let i (v) be a player and let si (v) be a
strategy such that player i can guarantee a strictly higher payoff than vi by committing to playing
mixed action si (v) (such a strategy exists because G does not admit Stackelberg-stable equilibria). Let
Γ = (i (v) , si (v))v∈NE(G) be the set of all such pairs. Let the states in the environment be
Ω =
{
ω0,
{
ω(i(v),si(v))
}
(i(v),si(v))∈Γ
}
.
Let u (ω0) = u0. For each state ω(i(v),si(v)), define u
(
ω(i(v),si(v))
)
as the payoff matrix of a zero-sum
game in which strategy si (v) is the unique (possibly mixed) action that guarantees player i the value
of the game
(
A, uSi(v)
)
. We now show that if p (ω0) is low enough, then the environment (Ω, p, A, u)
does not admit an act-rational equilibrium. Assume to the contrary that an act-rational equilibrium
exists, and let v0 be the induced Nash equilibrium in ω0 in this act-rational equilibrium. Assume
that p (ω0) is sufficiently low. Then, it is strictly profitable for player i (v0) to deviate to partition{{
ω0, ω(i(v0),si(v0))
}
, {ω}ω∈Ω
}
, and to play si (v0) in
{
ω0, ω(i(v0),si(v0))
}
and a minimax strategy in all
other states. This leads to a contradiction.
A normal-form game is generic if all action profiles yield different payoffs. Call an environment
generic if all its games are generic. The following proposition shows that any act-rational equilibrium
of a generic environment is preserved when a Stackelberg-stable game is added to the environment with
small enough probability. Formally:
Proposition 10. Let ((Ω, p) , A, u) be a generic environment that admits an act-rational equilibrium
τ = ((pi∗1 , σ∗1) , (pi∗2 , σ∗2)). Extend the environment by adding an additional state ω˜ to Ω with probability q
in which a Stackelberg-stable game (A, u (ω˜)) is played, and multiply the probabilities of any state ω ∈ Ω
by 1 − q. Then if q is small enough, the new environment ((Ω ∪ {ω˜} , p˜) , A, u) admits an act-rational
equilibrium that induces the same play in Ω.
Proof. Consider the following meta-strategy. Each player i chooses the partition p˜ii = {{ω˜} , pi∗i }. The
players play a Stackelberg-stable equilibrium in ω˜ with payoff v, and follow (σ∗1 , σ∗2) in Ω both on the
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equilibrium path and after any player has deviated in the first stage. If player i has deviated by choosing
a partition in which ω˜ is part of a non-trivial partition element, then the opponent plays in ω˜ a best-
reply to the deviator’s mixed action (which is determined by his play in the remaining states in the
partition element), which yields the deviator a payoff of at most vi (such a best reply exists due to the
Stackelberg stability of ω˜. The fact that ω˜ τ is act-rational and the environment is generic implies that
strict equilibria are played in all states. This implies that for sufficiently small q, the above strategy
profile is an act-rational equilibrium.
7 Discussion
We conclude by discussing the extension of our model to partial observability, the empirical predictions
of our model, and directions for future research.
7.1 Value of Information
One can reinterpret an environment as an incomplete-information game in which each player has a
minimal bound (the coarsest partition) and a maximal bound (the finest partition) on the amount of
information he may acquire about the state of nature. Each player first chooses how much information to
obtain within these bounds, and this choice is observable by the opponent, and then plays the incomplete
information game induced by his choice. The partition profile of a rule-rational equilibrium thus describes
an optimal information allocation (given his opponent’s behavior): each player acquires an optimal
amount of information, so that either obtaining more information or giving up information (weakly)
reduces the player’s payoff.
The results of Section 6 can be adapted to this interpretation as follows. Proposition 8 shows that if
all games in the environment are Stackelberg-stable, then information has a positive value, and there exist
an equilibrium in which both players choose to obtain the maximal amount of information. This extends
related existing results for constant-sum games and games with common interests (both families of games
are subsets of the set of Stackelberg-stable games). Proposition 9 shows that for any Stackelberg-unstable
game, there is an environment in which it is the only game with this property, and information has a
negative value: at least one of the players chooses to give up some information, and he will strictly lose
by obtaining that additional information. Finally, Proposition 10 shows that if the value of information
is positive at a specific equilibrium, then perturbing the environment by adding a Stackelberg-stable
game with small probability maintains the positive value of information.
7.2 Partial Observability
In this section, we briefly sketch how the model and the results can be extended to a setup in which
players only sometimes observe the partition of their opponent. Specifically, we change the definition of
the two-stage meta-game that is induced by the environment by assuming that each player privately and
independently observes his opponent’s partition with probability 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 (a` la Dekel et al. (2007)).12
Accordingly, we extend the definition of a meta-strategy to describe the behavior also after obtaining a
non-informative signal about the opponent’s partition. Finally, we define a rule-rational equilibrium as
a sequential equilibrium (Kreps & Wilson, 1982) of the meta-game.
12The results can be extended also to a setup in which the signal about the opponent’s partition is publicly observed (or
has a positive probability of being observed by the opponent).
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Observe that the case of q = 0 (i.e., non-observability of the opponent’s partition) can only induce
act-rational equilibria, and the case of q = 1 is equivalent to the basic model of Section 3. Most of the
results in this paper hold also in this extended setup for all values of 0 ≤ q ≤ 1: Prop. 1, 4-6, and 8-10.
The remaining results (Prop. 2-3 and 9) hold for a sufficiently high q < 1 (the threshold may depend on
the specific environment and the specific action profile).
7.3 Empirical Implications
One model implies that the predictive power of a Nash equilibrium is expected to be stronger in
Stackelberg-stable games, such as zero-sum games and coordination games, relative to Stackelberg-
unstable games, in which the ability to commit and to play first is advantageous. This implications fits
the stylized experimental facts (see Camerer, 2003, and the references there): (1) the aggregate play in
zero-sum games is close to the Nash equilibrium (see also the empirical support for this from the behavior
of professional tennis players in Walker & Wooders, 2001) ; (2) players are very good at coordinating
on one of the pure equilibria of a coordination game; and (3) the predictive power of Nash equilibria in
most other games is more limited.
Another insight from our the model is that the way in which people play a certain game depends
not only on its payoff, but also on the propensity of playing the game within the relevant environment.
Moreover, our model implies that games that are played proportionally more often should yield behavior
that is closer to the predictions of Nash equilibrium.
7.4 Future Research
We consider the current paper as a first step in a research agenda that studies the relations between
rule rationality and environment-related commitments that operate on emotional levels (See also Winter
et al., 2010). In what follows we briefly sketch two interesting directions to study in future research.
First, it would be interesting to extend the model by adding small costs for using more complex playing
rules (i.e., finer partitions). Second, it would be interesting to study environments that include games
in extensive form (rather than normal form), and adapt the notion of rule rationality also to actions at
decision nodes, and not only to strategies as a whole (e.g., a rule by which your first move is always
towards the terminal node with the highest payoff).
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